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Traditionally, teacher salaries have been determined solely by experience and educational 
attainment.  This has led to chronic shortages of teachers in particular subject areas, such as math, 
science and special education.  We study the first long-running statewide program to differentiate 
teacher pay based on subject area, Georgia’s bonus system for math and science teachers.  Using 
a difference-in-differences strategy, we find the bonuses reduce teacher attrition by 18 to 28 
percent.  However, we find no evidence the program increases the probability that education 
majors become secondary math or science teachers upon graduation or alters specific major 
choices within the education field.   
 
 
_________________ 
*The contents of this report were developed using data provided by Georgia’s Academic and Workforce Analysis and 
Research Data System (GA•AWARDS). However, those contents do not necessarily represent the policy of 
GA•AWARDS or any of its participating organizations, and you should not assume endorsement by GA•AWARDS 
or any of its participating organizations. This research was funded in part by the National Center for the Analysis of 
Longitudinal Data in Education Research (CALDER), which is funded by a consortium of foundations. For more 
information about CALDER funders, see www.caldercenter.org/about-calder. All opinions expressed in this paper are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the CALDER funders. 
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I. Introduction 
Traditionally, teachers have been paid according to fixed salary schedules, with wages 
determined solely by years of experience and educational attainment.  Given variation in the 
opportunity cost of teachers and in the non-pecuniary characteristics of jobs, the fixed salary 
schedules have led to chronic shortages of teachers in particular subject areas, such as math, 
science and special education.  Ingersoll and Perda (2009) find that roughly 3 to 4 times as many 
secondary schools report significant difficulty in filling positions in mathematics, special 
education and science relative to English or social studies.  Similarly, Billingsley, Fall, and 
Williams (2006) report that high percentages of uncertified new special educators enter teaching 
each year.   
Subject-specific teacher shortages which lead to placing out-of-field teachers in classrooms 
can have negative effects on students in both the short and long-run.  While existing research does 
not find a strong link between teacher credentials and student achievement in general, there is both 
direct and indirect evidence that having math, science or special education courses taught by 
teachers with neither a relevant college major nor certification in math and science can have 
negative consequences for student achievement.  The relative effectiveness in math and science of 
Teach-for-America (TFA) teachers, who have little formal training in education, but typically have 
strong academic backgrounds and subject area knowledge, suggests that content knowledge is 
particularly important in these fields.  Boyd, et al. (2006) and Kane, Rockoff and Staiger (2006) 
find TFA teachers are more effective than traditionally prepared teachers in math initially, 
particularly at the middle school level, in New York City.  Xu, Hannaway and Taylor (2011) 
analyze effectiveness of TFA teachers in North Carolina high schools and find TFA teachers are 
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more effective on average over all subjects, with the biggest difference in science and math.  The 
evidence is more direct in the case of special education, where Feng and Sass (2013) find that 
students with disabilities whose teacher is certified in special education have greater achievement 
in both math and reading than similar students whose teacher is not special-education certified.  
Over the longer term, Sass (2015) shows that students whose high school math and physics 
teachers have degrees in the relevant subject (rather than in education) are more likely to take 
STEM courses as college freshmen. 
To combat subject-specific teacher shortages, a number of non-salary incentives have been 
employed, including scholarship programs for prospective teachers, housing subsidies, tuition 
subsidies for existing teachers changing fields and student loan forgiveness (Martin, 2007).  We 
focus here on differential pay by subject -- monetary compensation that is based on the subject 
area a teacher is trained and teaches in.  Most such salary differentials are operated at the district 
level (Martin, 2007).  We are aware of only two statewide programs with differentiated teacher 
pay by subject area:  a bonus program in North Carolina that operated from 2001/02 to 2003/04 
and a salary supplement for early-career teachers that has been in effect in Georgia since 2010/11. 
In this paper we study the effects of Georgia’s statewide salary differential program.  We 
are interested in the impact of differential pay on retention of existing teachers in the short run as 
well as on the supply of new teachers in the long run.  The next section provides a review of prior 
research on subject-based compensation differentials and section 3 contains background 
information on Georgia’s differential pay system and discusses the data we employ.  Empirical 
methods and results are described in sections 4 and 5, respectively. The last section summarizes 
our findings and their implications for policy.  
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II. Literature Review 
Prior research on subject-based incentive schemes is quite limited.1  Only two previous 
studies analyze incentive programs targeting specific sub-disciplines for teachers.  Clotfelter, 
Glennie, Ladd, and Vigdor (2008) examine the impacts of a statewide bonus scheme that existed 
in North Carolina from 2001/02 to 2003/04.  To qualify for the program teachers had to be certified 
as a secondary teacher in math, science, or special education and be working in a high-poverty or 
low-performing public school.  Program participants could earn up to $1800 in annual bonuses.  
Exploiting the multiple eligibility criteria, they implement a triple difference analysis and find the 
bonus program lowered turnover rates for the targeted teachers by 17 percent.  
  Feng and Sass (2017) study Florida’s Critical Teacher Shortage Program, which was in 
effect from 1986/87 through 2009/10.  The program provided loan forgiveness for teachers who 
were certified and taught in “high-need” subjects and (for a brief time) retention bonuses.  
Employing a difference-in-difference estimator they find the loan forgiveness program decreased 
attrition of teachers in shortage areas, though the effects varied by subject.  Allowing for variation 
in the size of payments, they find that the effects were more pronounced when loan forgiveness 
payments were more generous.  A triple-difference estimate indicates the bonus program also 
substantially reduced the likelihood of teachers leaving the public-school sector.  Feng and Sass 
(2017)  also present evidence that loan forgiveness recipients were of higher quality (as measured 
                                                            
1 There is also some existing research on incentives to teach in high need schools.  Steel, Murnane and Willett (2009) 
study a California program that offered a $20,000 bonus to a select group of new teachers that agreed to teach in high-
need schools.  Glazerman, et al. (2013) conduct an experimental analysis of the “Teacher Transfer Initiative,” a 
federally funded initiative to that offered $20,000 in incentives for high-quality teachers to teach in low-achieving 
schools for two years.  Falch (2010, 2011) studies a decade-long bonus program for Norwegian teachers.  The program 
paid wage premiums to teachers in schools with chronic staffing shortages. 
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by value added) than non-recipients who taught in the same subject, but which were not certified 
and thus ineligible.  
III. Background and Data 
Driven by concerns over shortages of qualified math and science teachers and a lack of 
new teachers entering those fields, the 2009 Georgia legislature passed House Bill 280 (HB 280), 
which produced a de facto differential pay scale for early-career middle and high school math and 
science teachers.2  The legislation increased the pay of new math and science teachers to make it 
equal to that of a teacher with six years of experience: 
“(1) On and after July 1, 2010, and until such date as may be 
determined by the State Board of Education that mathematics, 
science, or both are no longer areas in which there an insufficient 
supply of teachers, a secondary school teacher in a local school 
system who is or becomes certified in mathematics or science by the 
Professional Standards Commission shall be moved to the salary 
step on the state salary schedule that is applicable to six years of 
creditable service, unless he or she is already on or above such  
salary step. From such salary step, the teacher shall be attributed one 
additional year of creditable service on the salary schedule each year 
for five years. 
(2) After five years, such teacher may continue to be attributed one 
additional year of creditable service on the salary schedule each year 
if he or she meets or exceeds student achievement criteria 
established by the Office of Student Achievement.  
(3) Upon expiration of five years, or any year thereafter that the 
teacher does not meet or exceed student achievement criteria as 
required by paragraph (2) of this subsection, such teacher shall be 
moved to the salary step applicable to the actual number of years of 
creditable service which the teacher has accumulated.” 
 
                                                            
2When signing the legislation into law, Governor Sonny Perdue noted that “Last year, Georgia produced only one 
physics teacher. This legislation will help us address the shortage of math and science teachers in the state.” 
(Badertscher, 2011). 
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The legislation also provided an annual stipend of $1,000 for kindergarten and elementary 
school teachers who possess an endorsement in mathematics or science.  The K-5 incentive is not 
conditional on experience.   Like the salary step increase for secondary math and science teachers, 
after five years, receipt of the K-5 stipend is conditional on student achievement criteria to be 
established by the Governor’s Office of Student Achievement. 
Both the grade 6-12 step increases and K-5 endorsement stipends were “subject to 
appropriations of the General Assembly.”  This led the program to be implemented in such a way 
that 6-12 salary-step increases became an experience-based bonus scheme that is not conditional 
on future employment.  Eligibility for the program is determined by certification status and subject 
areas taught in October of each year.  To be eligible for the grades 6-12 salary incentive, teachers 
must be certified in math or science, teach math or science in grades 6-12, and have between 0-5 
years of experience.  A teacher does not qualify for the salary incentives if he or she is teaching 
math or science under a temporary (“non-renewable”) certificate.3 
A list of eligible teachers is compiled by the end of the calendar year and forwarded to the 
legislature for funding.  Funds are appropriated by the legislature during their regular legislative 
session in spring of the calendar year following the October employment report.  Funds are 
typically received by the Georgia Department of Education (GaDOE) in July and then dispersed 
to individual school districts.  Teachers receive checks in late August or early September, almost 
a year after their eligibility is determined.  If an individual is no longer teaching in Georgia public 
schools they still receive the stipend. 
                                                            
3 Eligibility details are specified in Georgia Department of Education (2011) and Georgia Department of Education 
(2015a). 
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The amount of the stipend is determined by the difference between the step on the state 
salary schedule based on a teacher’s actual experience and the salary step for a teacher with six 
years of service.  Even though some districts pay teachers more than what is stipulated in the state 
salary schedule, the amount of the bonus is determined by the applicable salary differences on the 
state salary schedule, not a teacher’s actual salary.   
Funds have never been allocated to implement the provision of the statute which extends 
salary incentives beyond five years of experience.  Therefore, the bonus ends when a teacher has 
reached six years of experience.  Since the current implementation of HB 280 does not extend 
bonuses beyond five years, the provisions that make future bonuses contingent on performance 
have never been implemented.  An example of the bonuses a new secondary math or science 
teacher with a bachelor’s would receive is provided in Table 1.  The bonuses total slightly more 
than $21,000 over six years. 
The total number of teachers who received the bonuses, broken down by year and type of 
supplement, is presented in Table 2A.  The number of first-time recipients, also broken down by 
year and supplement type, is presented in Table 2B.  Due to the greater number of middle and high 
school math and science teachers (relative to elementary school teachers with a math or science 
endorsement) and the more generous supplement to middle and high school math and science 
teachers, the size of the grades 6-12 program is much larger.  After the initial year, about 1,100 to 
1,200 middle and high school teachers receive the salary supplement for the first time each year.  
In contrast, the first-time K-5 supplement recipients have ranged from 85 to just over 200 teachers 
each year.  We therefore focus our analysis on the salary supplements for middle and high school 
math and science teachers.  
  
7 
 
In order to estimate the effects of HB 280 on the supply of math and science teachers, we 
employ data from Georgia’s new statewide longitudinal database, Georgia’s Academic and 
Workforce Analysis and Research Data System (GA•AWARDS).  GA•AWARDS combines data 
from all educational agencies in Georgia as well as unemployment insurance (UI) records from 
the Georgia Department of Labor.  Thus, individual students can be tracked from pre-K through 
post-secondary institutions and into the labor force.  The database includes data from the 2006/07 
school year forward and we have received data through the 2014/15 school year.  Teachers can be 
linked to their college records and to the students they teach, though teacher-student linkages are 
only available for Race-to-the-Top participating districts in 2013/14 and 2014/15.  Although 
student-teacher linkages are limited, we can link students and teachers to schools for all years.  We 
therefore use school-level averages of student characteristics to control for working conditions that 
may influence teacher labor market decisions.  
The GA•AWARDS data include information on employee job codes, teacher certification 
and years of experience, which can be used to determine whether a teacher meets the requirements 
to qualify for a salary supplement.  In addition, we received data from the GaDOE that indicate 
which teachers were designated to receive the supplement each year.  The list of teachers who 
qualify (based on job, certification and experience information) does not always correspond to the 
list of recipients, however.4  We therefore rely on the list of actual recipients to identify “treated” 
teachers. 
                                                            
4 There are a number of interesting anomalies in the program’s implementation.  Teacher experience is based on 
Certified/Classified Personnel Information (CPI) data from the GaDOE.  The CPI data track “credible” years of 
service, not actual years of service.  For example, a teacher may not have received a step increase because of poor 
performance or insufficient funding and thus have fewer reported years of service than their actual years of classroom 
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IV. Econometric Methods 
Below we describe our empirical strategy for estimating the effects of Georgia’s 
differential pay system (HB 280) on the retention of existing teachers and the supply of new 
teachers.   
A. Short-Run Effects: Retention of Existing Teachers 
To estimate the effect of differentiated pay on teacher retention we exploit the fact that 
teachers had to be both eligible for the differential pay program and the program had to be in place 
to receive payment.  The program had three eligibility criteria: an individual had to be teaching 
secondary math or science, they had to be certified in the subject they were teaching, and they had 
to have less than six years of credible service.  We initially estimate a simple difference-in-
difference model of the duration of teaching in Georgia public schools.  Specifically, we estimate 
a Cox proportional hazard model of the form: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡[𝜆(𝑡𝑖)] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑖
𝑀𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐸𝑖
𝑀𝑆 × 𝑍𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡  (1) 
where λ(ti) is the probability that a teaching spell ends at the close of period t for teacher i, 
conditional on that spell lasting through period t.5  𝐸𝑖
𝑀𝑆 is an indicator for teachers who ever meet 
the HB 280 eligibility criteria of being certified and teaching in either secondary math or science 
and having less than six years of experience.  𝑍𝑡  is an indicator that signifies the salary differential 
program was in place in year t.  Xit is a vector of teacher and school characteristics that typically 
impact teacher attrition decisions (e.g. demographic characteristics of students at the school, 
                                                            
experience.  There is also evidence that some districts may have miscoded science teachers as teaching social science.  
See Griffin and McGuire (2015) and Georgia Department of Education (2015b).  
 
5 We determine the end of a spell based on whether a teacher is teaching in a Georgia public school in period t+1. 
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teacher race and gender, etc.).  The set of coefficients β1 represent the difference in the hazard rates 
between ever-eligible teachers (those with less than six years of experience who are certified and 
teaching secondary math or science) and never-eligible teachers.  β2 represents the impact of being 
in the period in the differential pay program was in place (school years 2010/11 and later).  The 
coefficient of interest is β3, which represents the effect of being eligible for the differential pay 
program and being in a year in which the program was in effect.6  β3 therefore provides the simple 
difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of the differential-pay program on the exit hazard.  
We can also break down the eligibility criteria into its separate components:  certified and 
teaching middle/high school math or science and less than six years of experience.  This allows us 
to estimate a “triple difference” model of teacher attrition: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡[𝜆(𝑡𝑖)] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑖
𝑀𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑙𝑡6 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑖
𝑀𝑆 × 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑙𝑡6) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝑖
𝑀𝑆 × 𝑍𝑡) + 
𝛽6(𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑙𝑡6 × 𝑍𝑡) + 𝛽7(𝐶𝑖
𝑀𝑆 × 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑙𝑡6 × 𝑍𝑡) + 𝛽8(𝑋𝑖𝑡) (5) 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝑆 indicates teachers who were certified and teaching in math or certified and teaching in 
science, 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑙𝑡6 indicates teachers who have not reached their sixth year of service and 𝑍𝑡 indicates 
the years the program was in effect.  The three two-way interaction terms in equation (5) represent: 
(i) the differential impact of being certified and teaching secondary math and science and having  
five or fewer years of service (𝐶𝑖
𝑀𝑆 × 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑙𝑡6), (ii) the impact of being certified and teaching 
secondary math or science in a year when the differential pay program was in effect (𝐶𝑖
𝑀𝑆 × 𝑍𝑡), 
and (iii) the impact of being a teacher with less than six years of experience in the period the 
differential pay program existed (𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑙𝑡6 × 𝑍𝑡).  Lastly, the three-way interaction term, 
                                                            
6 Note, as described above, we use an indicator for actual recipients in place of the interaction term. 
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(𝐶𝑖
𝑀𝑆 × 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑙𝑡6 × 𝑍𝑡), represents the differential hazard rate of teachers who were certified and 
teaching secondary math or certified and teaching secondary science and possessed less than six 
years of experience during years in which the differential pay program existed.  The coefficient β7 
is thus the difference-in-difference-in-difference estimate of the differential pay program's impact 
on the exit hazard. 
B. Long-Run Effects: The Supply of New Secondary Math and Science Teachers  
There are two ways to become a public-school teacher in Georgia.  The most common 
method is for potential teachers to complete a state-approved certification program, meet content 
assessment requirements, and then obtain a renewable professional teaching certificate.  
Alternatively, candidates with a bachelor’s degree in any field can obtain a three-year non-
renewable teaching certificate and begin teaching.  In order to transition to a renewable teaching 
certificate, individuals must either complete a traditional university based preparation program or 
an alternate state approved educator preparation program. 
As illustrated in Table 3, a bit more than one-third of middle and high school math and 
science teachers in Georgia earned their first baccalaureate degree in a field other than education, 
while just under two-thirds were education majors.  While most new public-school teachers in 
Georgia obtained baccalaureate degrees in education, not all education majors end up as public 
school teachers.  Indeed, about one-third of education majors in Georgia do not become public 
school teachers within a year of graduation.   Thus, one way that pay differentials could impact 
the supply of new math and science teachers is to boost the likelihood that individuals with 
bachelor’s degrees in education become public-school teachers. 
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The likelihood of becoming a public-school teacher will depend on both supply and 
demand factors for recent college graduates.  As a proxy for general labor market conditions we 
control for the unemployment rate.  Higher unemployment rates indicate a depressed demand for 
workers generally and should be negatively correlated with employment probabilities of new 
graduates.  As a crude measure of worker quality, we include the college GPA of education majors 
as an additional control.  
To assess the effect of HB 280 on the supply of new teachers we estimate the following 
probit “difference-in-differences” model on the sample of all baccalaureate degree recipients with 
a major in education: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑇𝑖
𝐴𝑛𝑦 = 1] = Φ[𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑖
𝑗
+ 𝛾2𝑍𝑡 + 𝛾3(𝐷𝑖
𝑗
× 𝑍𝑡) + 𝛾4𝑈𝑡 + 𝛾5𝐺𝑖] (6) 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑇𝑖
𝐴𝑛𝑦] is the probability that individual i becomes a public-school teacher in any 
subject area within one year of receiving a bachelor’s degree in education.  𝐷𝑖
𝑗
 is an indicator for 
an education major in subject(s) j, where j represents the set of majors that are most common for 
secondary math and science teachers (see Table 3 above) and thus most likely to be able to take 
advantage of the HB 280 program.  𝑍𝑡 is an indicator that signifies the salary differential program 
was in place in year t.  Ut is the unemployment rate in year t and Gi is the college grade point 
average of individual i.  The coefficient  represents the increase in probability of becoming a 
public-school teacher if an individual majors in education subject(s) j, rather than in some other 
sub-discipline of education.  The second difference is between the pre- and post-HB 280 periods 
(i.e. before and after 2010), 2.  The coefficient of interest is 3, which represents the effect of 
graduating with an education major in subject(s) j in a year in which the differential pay program 
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was in effect.  The coefficient 3 provides the simple difference-in-difference estimate of the 
impact of the differential-pay program on the likelihood of becoming a teacher, i.e. the difference 
between graduates with majors(s) j and other education majors in the probability change from the 
pre-program program period to the program period.   
We also conduct a similar analysis, focusing on becoming a secondary math or science 
teacher within one year of graduation, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑇𝑖
𝑀𝑆]: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑇𝑖
𝑀𝑆 = 1] = Φ[𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑖
𝑗
+ 𝛾2𝑍𝑡 + 𝛾3(𝐷𝑖
𝑗
× 𝑍𝑡) + 𝛾4𝑈𝑡 + 𝛾5𝐺𝑖] (7) 
While (6) directly estimates the event of interest, becoming a secondary math or science teacher, 
it does not account for teachers who may not teach a middle or high school math or science course 
in their first year, but teach those courses later.  Thus we view estimates of the parameters in (6) 
and (7) as complementary.  Equation (6) captures graduates who become teachers, some of which 
may never teach middle or high school math and science while equation (7) focuses on teachers 
who immediately teach middle and high school math and science courses but omits teachers who 
may teach in those subject areas in their second or later years of teaching. 
In addition to altering the job choice of recent graduates with education degrees, the 
enhanced pay for early-career math and science teachers engendered by HB 280 could influence 
college major choice as well.  While it is doubtful that the targeted pay increase would cause 
students interested in significantly different careers to switch to education, those already interested 
in teaching might be induced to change their specific major within education to be able to qualify 
for jobs that would be eligible for supplemental pay under HB 280.  To estimate this potential 
longer-run supply effect, we estimate the following model: 
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝐷𝑖
𝑗
= 1] = Φ[𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐹𝑍𝑖 + 𝛿2𝐹𝐷𝑡
𝐸𝑑 + 𝛾3𝑈𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐺𝑖] (8) 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝐷𝑖
𝑗
= 1] is the probability that individual I earns a degree in education field(s) j 
(conditional on having declared an education major by their sophomore year and earning a degree 
in education), FZi is our measure of exposure to treatment; it is the fraction of time between a 
student’s sophomore year and the year they graduate that the HB 280 program was in place.  𝐹𝐷𝑡
𝐸𝑑 
is the number of BA/BS degrees awarded in the student’s graduation year as a fraction of all BA.BS 
degrees awarded in that year; it is intended to capture the prevailing popularity of education majors 
in general.  As in prior equations, demand is captured by the unemployment rate in year t, and the 
college grade point average of individual i, Gi.  
V. Empirical Results 
A.  Descriptive Analyses 
In Figure 1 we provide a graphical comparison between attrition of early-career teachers 
in general and early-career secondary math and science teachers.  Annual attrition rates for both 
groups fall in the 10-13 percent range.  Consistent with higher opportunity costs, attrition rates are 
higher for secondary math and science teachers in all but one year. 
Figure 2 provides a comparison of attrition between middle and high school math and 
science teachers who received salary supplements as a result of HB 280 and those which never 
received a supplement, using a survival analysis framework.  Teachers could be in the latter group 
for four reasons.  First, some of these teachers entered teaching and left the Georgia public schools 
prior to the implementation of HB 280 in 2010/11 and thus never received a bonus.  Second, some 
may have begun their careers as secondary math and science teachers but switched to other grades 
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or subjects before the implementation of HB 280.  Third, some math and science teachers may 
never have obtained non-temporary certification during the period of analysis.  Forth, there are 
some teachers who met the criteria for eligibility, but due to implementation issues, may have been 
left off the list of teachers who were to receive a bonus.  In order to compare time until departure 
from Georgia public schools, only teachers observed during their first year of teaching are included 
in the sample.   
 The survival plots indicate that bonus recipients tended to have lower attrition than 
teachers who did not receive bonuses, particularly in the early years of their career, when 
supplements were the greatest.  After five years of experience (when teachers could no longer 
receive the supplements) the two groups exhibit similar survival patterns.  One potential problem 
with comparing ever and never-recipients is that non-receipt is partly a function of when a teacher 
entering the Georgia public school system.  Given the sample starts in 2006/07 and program 
implementation began in 2010/11, teaching spells greater than five years are only observed for 
teachers who had prior experience when the program began.  In order to disentangle these cohort 
effects, we also present survival estimates for the subset of teachers who began teaching in 2010/11 
or later.  The results, provided in Figure 3, are similar to those for the full sample. 
B.  Quantitative Analyses – Teacher Retention 
As noted above, the data available to us begins in 2006/07, just four years prior to the start 
of the HB 280 program.  Thus, we do not observe the first year of teaching for many teachers, but 
we do know how many years they had taught prior to the start of our analysis period and can 
conduct a survival analysis over the years they are observed.  Put differently, the teaching history 
of some of the teachers in our sample are “left censored.”  As shown in Table 4, nearly 60 percent 
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of teachers who taught middle/high school math or science during the sample period fall into this 
left-censored category.  Descriptive statistics for both the full sample of middle and high school 
math and science teachers as was as the subsample of teachers observed for their entire career are 
presented in Table 4.  For the subsample of 8,914 teachers observed in their first year of teaching, 
roughly half ever received a salary supplement as a result of HB 280.7   
Estimates from the difference-in-difference hazard models of exit from Georgia public 
schools are reported in Table 5.  For the full sample that includes all teachers, the hazard ratio on 
the indicator for receipt of a supplement is 0.820, indicating that receiving differential pay reduced 
the probability of exit by 18 percent.  The estimate is significantly different from zero at better 
than a 99 percent confidence level.  Limiting the sample to teachers who ever taught math or 
science within the analysis period of 2006/07-2015/16, the results are nearly identical.  If we 
further limit the sample to ever-math-or-science teachers who are observed from their first year 
forward, the estimated effect of the supplemental pay program on the probability of exit is slightly 
higher greater; exit rates are reduced by 19 percent. 
Estimates from the triple-difference model are presented in Table 6.  The estimated impacts 
of the HB 280 differential pay program on the likelihood of exit are even stronger in this 
specification.  Depending on the sample, the program is estimated to reduce the likelihood of exit 
from 25 to 28 percent. 
                                                            
7 One potential source of misclassification among these teachers are anomalies in reported teacher experience.  As a 
check, we also estimate models for the subsample of teachers who are observed as rookies and whose reported 
experience increases by one for every year they taught.  Results are similar to those from the full sample. 
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One potential problem with the difference-in-difference and triple-difference estimators is 
potential violation of the “parallel trends” assumption.  Under the difference-in-difference 
approach, the ever-treated and never-treated groups are allowed to have different exit rates prior 
to treatment, but it is assumed that the difference in the rates is constant over time.  Thus any 
change in the difference in the exit rates of the ever-treated and never-treated groups once 
treatment occurs is attributed to the treatment. 
A common approach to testing the parallel-trends assumption is to allow the “effect” of 
being in the treatment group to vary by year for both the pre- and post-treatment periods.  In our 
context this is accomplished by including indicators for each year (except the base year) and then 
interacting each of the year indicators with either actual pay supplement receipt (in the post-
treatment period) or meeting the requirements to qualify supplemental pay (in the pre-treatment 
period).  If the parallel-trends assumption holds, the coefficients on the (qualified  year) 
interactions should be insignificant for the pre-treatment years.  The (received bonus  year) 
interactions during the post-treatment period allow for the impact of the program to change over 
time (e.g. if there is initial uncertainty in likelihood of continuation, effects might be stronger in 
later years).  
Table 7 provides estimates of the difference-in-difference and triple-difference models that 
allow for differential trends in both the pre- and post-treatment periods.  The interaction between 
“qualified” and the two pre-treatment years is not significant in either the DD or DDD specification 
(the 2008 base year interaction is omitted to avoid collinearity with the overall constant).  Thus we 
fail to reject the parallel-trends assumption.  The actual-treatment/year interactions are somewhat 
variable, though there does appear to be a general upward trend over time. The apparent increasing 
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impact of the pay supplement over time is consistent with the program becoming better known and 
the confidence in its permanency increasing.8   
C.  Quantitative Analyses – Teacher Supply 
In Table 8 we present estimates of the model that predicts the probability of becoming a 
public-school teacher, conditional on having earned a bachelor’s degree in education.  The first 
column focuses on the interaction between HB 280 and the most common major for middle and 
high school math and science teachers, Middle/Secondary Education.  The second column presents 
estimates based on the three most common education majors of future middle and high school 
math and science teachers: Middle/Secondary Education, Special Education, and Math Education 
or Science Education (incl. specific science education disciplines).  When the potentially impacted 
group is limited to middle/secondary education majors, having the HB 280 supplemental pay 
program in effect is not found to boost the likelihood of becoming a public-school teacher.  
However, when the list of potentially effected education majors is expanded to include Special 
Education and Math or Science Education, the availability of the HB 280 program is associated 
with an increase in the likelihood of becoming a public-school teacher by 15 percentage points.  
This effect seems to be mainly driven by the inclusion of special education majors and thus must 
be interpreted with caution as the demand for special education teachers was increasing over the 
period in which HB 280 was instituted. 
Table 9 presents estimates of equation (7), which also predicts the probability of becoming 
a public-school teacher, but a positive outcome is limited to middle and high school math and 
                                                            
8 A potential countervailing factor is the average payout is changing over time as the experience distribution of 
qualifiers is changing. 
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science teachers.  In this case, we find no evidence that the HB 280 program increased the 
likelihood that graduates with an education degree would become secondary math or science 
teachers in public schools within one year of earning their college degree. 
Finally, estimates of the impact of supplemental pay for math and science teachers on the 
choice of specific majors within education are presented in Table 10.  Conditional on declaring an 
education major by their sophomore year, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
supplemental pay program created by HB 280 had no impact of the specific major choice of 
eventual education baccalaureate degree recipients. 
VI.  Discussion 
There is growing concern over shortages of teachers, though there is considerable 
variability in hiring and retaining teachers across disciplines.  Finding and keeping teachers in 
secondary math and science and in special education is much more problematic than recruiting 
and retaining teachers in other subjects or grade levels.  The cause of the shortages seems clear; 
the opportunity cost of teachers depends on the alternative wage they could earn in occupations 
outside of public school teaching and thus the equilibrium wage varies across subject areas.  
Teachers with expertise in math and science are likely to garner relatively higher wages outside of 
teaching and thus a uniform pay scale is destined to produce shortages of teachers in those subject 
areas.  An obvious solution would be to raise the wages of math, science and special education 
teachers relative to the wages of other teachers.  Little is currently known, however, about the 
impact differential pay would have on the supply of new teachers and the attrition of existing 
teachers. 
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In this paper we analyze the impact of the only statewide differential pay program currently 
in existence – Georgia’s HB280 supplemental pay for math and science teachers – on both teacher 
retention and the supply of new teachers.  Our findings indicate that Georgia’s differential pay 
system has led to a substantial reduction in attrition rates for secondary math and science teachers.  
In contrast, we find mixed evidence the program has boosted the likelihood of education graduates 
will become public school teachers immediately after earning their baccalaureate degrees and no 
evidence the program increased the probability that education majors would immediately become 
secondary math or science teachers upon graduation.  We also found no evidence of the differential 
pay program altering specific major choices within the education field.   
While it is possible that stronger effects on the supply of new teachers could emerge as the 
program becomes better known to prospective teachers and confidence in the program’s 
permanence increases, the retention effects alone suggest that differential pay is a viable tool for 
combating chronic shortages of teachers in “high need” fields like middle and high school math 
and science. 
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Figure 1.  Percentage of Teachers Leaving Georgia Public Schools by Year (Teachers with 
5 or Less Years of Experience) 
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Figure 2.  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates of Teaching in Georgia Public Schools 
(Math/Science Teachers Observed in Their First Year of Teaching, 2006/07-2014/15) 
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Figure 3.  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates of Teaching in Georgia Public Schools 
(Math/Science Teachers Observed in Their First Year of Teaching, 2010/11-2014/15) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
25 
 
Table 1.  Salary Supplement for a 6-12 Math/Science Teacher in Georgia 
 
Actual Years of 
Experience 
Statewide Salary Schedule 
(Teacher with a Bachelor’s Degree) 
Salary Based on 
Actual Years of 
Experience 
Salary Based on 
Six Years of 
Experience 
Supplement 
0         $33,424          $37,985           $4,561 
1         $33,424          $37,985           $4,561 
2         $33,424          $37,985           $4,561 
3         $34,427          $37,985           $3,558 
4         $35,460          $37,985           $2,525 
5         $36,524          $37,985           $1,461 
Total           $21,227 
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Table 2A.  Number of Teachers Receiving Differential Pay by Year 
 
Year All Teachers 6-12 Math and Science Teachers 
 
Did Not 
Receive 
Received 
K-5 Bonus 
Received 
6-12 Bonus 
Total 
Did Not 
Receive 
Received 
6-12 Bonus 
Total 
2006/07 118,434 0 0 118,434 19,597 0 19,597 
2007/08 122,274 0 0 122,274 19,947 0 19,947 
2008/09 122,474 0 0 122,474 20,572 0 20,572 
2009/10 118,392 0 0 118,392 20,105 0 20,105 
2010/11 109,784 0 3,765 113,169 16,606 3,334 19,940 
2011/12 107,557 149 3,274 110,661 16,997 3,274 20,271 
2012/13 105,117 208 3,107 108,432 16,893 3,105 19,998 
2013/14 103,425 380 3,077 106,443 16,759 3,075 19,834 
2014/15 103,483 529 3,188 107,200 16,580 3,187 19,767 
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Table 2B.  Number of Teachers Receiving Differential Pay for the First Time by Year 
 
Year All Teachers 6-12 Math and Science Teachers 
 
Did Not 
Receive 
Received 
K-5 Bonus 
Received 
6-12 Bonus 
Total 
Did Not 
Receive 
Received 
6-12 Bonus 
Total 
2006/07 118,434 0 0 118,434 19,597 0 19,597 
2007/08 122,274 0 0 122,274 19,947 0 19,947 
2008/09 122,474 0 0 122,474 20,572 0 20,572 
2009/10 118,392 0 0 118,392 20,105 0 20,105 
2010/11 109,784 0 3,765 113,549 16,606 3,334 19,940 
2011/12 109,540 149 1,291 110,980 18,974 1,291 20,265 
2012/13 107,204 85 1,143 108,432 18,847 1,141 19,988 
2013/14 105,610 189 1,083 106,882 18,745 1,082 19,827 
2014/15 105,830 203 1,167 107,200 18,588 1,166 19,754 
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Table 3. First BA/BS Degree of Teachers in Georgia who Ever Taught Middle/High Math 
and Science Courses during 2008-2016 and Earned a BA/BS Degree in Georgia in 2007-
2015 
 
First BA/BS Degree 
Proportion of Math or 
Science Teachers with 
Known BA/BS Degree 
Any Non-Education 0.373 
 Math/Statistics 0.086 
 Biology/Bio Med 0.074 
 Physical Sciences (incl. specific disciplines) 0.028 
 Engineering 0.011 
Any Education Degree 0.627 
 Middle or Secondary Education 0.264 
 Special Education 0.121 
 Math Education or Science Education (incl. specific disciplines) 0.088 
 Early Childhood/Pre-K Education  0.074 
 Elementary Education 0.042 
Observations 6,406 
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Table 4. Means of Characteristics of 6-12 Math and Science Teachers 
 
 
All 6-12 Math and Science 
Teachers 
6-12 Math and Science Teachers 
Observed in their First Year of 
Teaching 
 All  Teachers 
Who 
Received 
Bonus 
Teachers 
Who Did 
Not 
Receive 
Bonus 
All  Teachers 
Who 
Received 
Bonus 
Teachers 
Who Did 
Not 
Receive 
Bonus 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Female 0.7438 0.7138 0.7458 0.7147 0.7037 0.7249 
Black 0.2480 0.2949 0.2448 0.3014 0.2534 0.3461 
Hispanic 0.0081 0.0169 0.0075 0.0141 0.0135 0.0147 
Asian/PI 0.0147 0.0200 0.0143 0.0213 0.0199 0.0226 
Other Non-White 0.0057 0.0082 0.0056 0.0095 0.0086 0.0104 
Renewable/Prof. Cert. 0.5661 0.5072 0.5701 0.4022 0.4714 0.3380 
Non-renewable Cert. 0.0623 0.1174 0.0586 0.1829 0.1352 0.2272 
Other Cert. 0.3816 0.3754 0.3820 0.4149 0.3935 0.4348 
Ever Taught ELA 0.1526 0.0887 0.1569 0.1316 0.0840 0.1758 
Ever Taught Math 0.4822 0.5431 0.4782 0.4933 0.5318 0.4576 
Ever Taught Reading 0.0689 0.0221 0.0720 0.0686 0.0286 0.1057 
Ever Taught Science K-5 0.0397 0.0200 0.0410 0.0503 0.0207 0.0777 
Ever Taught Science 6-12 0.3310 0.3677 0.3285 0.3000 0.3548 0.2491 
Ever Taught Social Studies 0.1210 0.0790 0.1238 0.1169 0.0752 0.1556 
Ever Taught ESOL 0.0027 0.0026 0.0027 0.0019 0.0018 0.0020 
Ever Taught Gifted 0.0036 0.0010 0.0038 0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 
Observations 31,171 1,950 29,221 12,610 6,074 6,536 
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Table 5.  Hazard Ratios for Difference-in-Differences (DD) Teacher Duration Models 
 
 DD - Full Sample DD - Math/Sci. 
Only 
DD - Math/Sci. 
Only - Exclude 
Left Censored 
Received Supplement in Current 
Year 
0.820** 
(0.030) 
0.819** 
(0.033) 
0.808** 
(0.037) 
Ever Qualified 1.064** 
(0.022) 
1.223** 
(0.032) 
1.290** 
(0.045) 
Program in Effect 1.072** 
(0.018) 
1.305** 
(0.047) 
1.334** 
(0.095) 
Female Teacher 1.015 
(0.012) 
0.927** 
(0.020) 
0.881** 
(0.032) 
Black Teacher 0.878** 
(0.011) 
0.910** 
(0.024) 
0.878** 
(0.039) 
Hispanic Teacher 1.019 
(0.036) 
1.034 
(0.094) 
1.105 
(0.140) 
Asian/PI Teacher 1.152** 
(0.052) 
1.268** 
(0.089) 
1.463** 
(0.141) 
Other Non-White Teacher 1.122** 
(0.047) 
1.131 
(0.092) 
1.034 
(0.149) 
School-Level Student 
Demographic Controls 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 639,220 160,308 42,660 
Log likelihood -493,746 -98,779 -31,294 
School-level student demographics include Percent Limited English Proficiency, Percent Foreign Born, Percent 
Primary Language Non-English, Percent Free/Reduced-Price Lunch, Percent Immigrant, Percent Homeless, Percent 
Retained in Grade, Average Age Within Grade, Percent Gifted and Percent with Disabilities.  Reported estimates are 
exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 6.  Hazard Ratios for Triple-Difference (DDD) Teacher Duration Models 
 
 DDD - Full 
Sample 
DDD - Math/Sci. 
Only 
DDD - Math/Sci. 
Only - Exclude 
Left Censored 
Received Supplement in Current 
Year 
0.747** 
(0.030) 
0.737** 
(0.035) 
0.722** 
(0.036) 
Ever Certified and Teaching Math 
or Science 
0.726** 
(0.020) 
0.788** 
(0.032) 
0.706** 
(0.075) 
<6 Years of Experience 1.410** 
(0.042) 
1.092 
(0.069) 
0.851 
(0.141) 
Program in Effect 1.069** 
(0.019) 
1.098* 
(0.051) 
0.797 
(0.145) 
Certified and Teaching Math or 
Science  <6 Years of Experience 
1.217** 
(0.041) 
1.290** 
(0.058) 
1.314** 
(0.105) 
Certified and Teaching Math or 
Science  Program in Effect 
1.361** 
(0.040) 
1.360** 
(0.059) 
1.551** 
(0.135) 
<6 Years of Exp.  Program in 
Effect 
0.889** 
(0.021) 
1.072 
(0.055) 
1.419* 
(0.252) 
Female Teacher 1.016 
(0.012) 
0.929** 
(0.020) 
0.889** 
(0.033) 
Black Teacher 0.876** 
(0.011) 
0.904** 
(0.023) 
0.865** 
(0.039) 
Hispanic Teacher 1.014 
(0.036) 
1.033 
(0.094) 
1.099 
(0.139) 
Asian/PI Teacher 1.173** 
(0.053) 
1.281** 
(0.090) 
1.486** 
(0.144) 
Other Non-White Teacher 1.116** 
(0.047) 
1.120 
(0.091) 
1.019 
(0.147) 
School-Level Student 
Demographic Controls 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 639,220 160,308 42,660 
Log likelihood -493,598 -98,757 -31,282 
School-level student demographics include Percent Limited English Proficiency, Percent Foreign Born, Percent 
Primary Language Non-English, Percent Free/Reduced-Price Lunch, Percent Immigrant, Percent Homeless, Percent 
Retained in Grade, Average Age Within Grade, Percent Gifted and Percent with Disabilities.  Reported estimates are 
exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 7:  Hazard Ratios for Difference-in-Differences (DD) and Triple-Difference Models 
with Pre-/Post-Year Interactions 
 
 DD - Full Sample DDD - Full Sample 
Received Supplement  Year 2011 0.778** 
(0.057) 
0.720** 
(0.055) 
Received Supplement  Year 2012 0.730** 
(0.059) 
0.674** 
(0.056) 
Received Supplement  Year 2013 0.815** 
(0.062) 
0.757** 
(0.059) 
Received Supplement  Year 2014 0.818** 
(0.063) 
0.767** 
(0.061) 
Received Supplement  Year 2015 0.959 
(0.069) 
0.902 
(0.067) 
Qualified  Year 2009 0.948 
(0.068) 
1.076 
(0.088) 
Qualified  Year 2010 1.020 
(0.068) 
1.157 
(0.090) 
Ever Qualified 1.067** 
(0.025) 
 
Ever Certified and Teaching Math or Science  0.715** 
(0.021) 
<6 Years of Experience  1.403** 
(0.042) 
Certified and Teaching Math or Science  <6 
Years of Experience 
 1.173** 
(0.047) 
Certified and Teaching Math or Science  
Program in Effect 
 1.390** 
(0.045) 
<6 Years of Experience  Program in Effect  0.897** 
(0.021) 
Female Teacher 1.015 
(0.012) 
1.017 
(0.012) 
Black Teacher 0.878** 
(0.011) 
0.876** 
(0.011) 
Hispanic Teacher 1.019 
(0.036) 
1.014 
(0.036) 
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Asian/PI Teacher 1.151** 
(0.052) 
1.172** 
(0.053) 
Other Non-White Teacher 1.122** 
(0.047) 
1.117** 
(0.047) 
Year = 2009 0.911** 
(0.016) 
0.912** 
(0.017) 
Year = 2010 1.052** 
(0.017) 
1.061** 
(0.019) 
Year = 2012 1.059** 
(0.018) 
1.061** 
(0.018) 
Year = 2013 1.139** 
(0.019) 
1.140** 
(0.019) 
Year = 2014 1.146** 
(0.020) 
1.149** 
(0.020) 
Year = 2015 1.124** 
(0.020) 
1.126** 
(0.020) 
School-Level Student Demographic Controls ✓ ✓ 
Observations 639,220 639,220 
Log likelihood -493,742 -493,592 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 8.  Probit Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Probability of Becoming a 
Public School Teacher in any Subject Within One Year of Graduation, Conditional on 
Earning a Bachelor’s Degree in Education 
 
 
Become a Public School Teacher Within 
One Year of Receiving Bachelor’s Degree 
BA/BS in Middle School or Secondary Education 
 Program in Effect 
0.106 
(0.055) 
 
BA/BS in Middle School, Secondary, Math,  
Science or Special Education  Program in Effect 
 
0.150** 
(0.042) 
BA/BS in Middle School or Secondary Education 
0.402** 
(0.044) 
 
BA/BS in Middle School, Secondary, Math, 
Science or Special Education 
 
0.400** 
(0.033) 
Program in Effect 
0.025 
(0.019) 
0.007 
(0.021) 
College GPA 
0.447** 
(0.022) 
0.436** 
(0.022) 
Unemployment Rate (in percent) 
-0.187** 
(0.005) 
-0.187** 
(0.005) 
Constant 
-0.319** 
(0.081) 
-0.328** 
(0.082) 
Observations 22,407 22,407 
Reported coefficients are marginal effects.  Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 9.  Probit Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Probability of Teaching 
Middle/High School Math or Science Within One Year of Graduation, Conditional on 
Earning a Bachelor’s Degree in Education 
 
 
Teach Middle or High School Math or 
Science in a Public School Within One 
Year of Receiving Bachelor’s Degree 
BA/BS in Middle School or Secondary Education 
 Program in Effect 
-0.059 
(0.062) 
 
BA/BS in Middle School, Secondary, Math,  
Science or Special Education  Program in Effect 
 
-0.123 
(0.067) 
BA/BS in Middle School or Secondary Education 
1.273** 
(0.049) 
 
BA/BS in Middle School, Secondary, Math, 
Science or Special Education 
 
1.717** 
(0.054) 
Program in Effect 
0.073* 
(0.034) 
0.177** 
(0.055) 
College GPA 
0.053 
(0.034) 
0.002 
(0.037) 
Unemployment Rate (in percent) 
-0.057** 
(0.008) 
-0.057** 
(0.009) 
Constant 
-1.545** 
(0.128) 
-1.935** 
(0.146) 
Observations 22,407 22,407 
Reported coefficients are marginal effects.  Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 10.  Probit Estimates of the Probability of Earning a BA/BS in Specified Education 
Majors, Conditional on Having Declared an Education Major by Sophomore Year and 
Earning a BA/BS Degree in any Education Major 
 
 BA/BS in Middle 
School or 
Secondary School 
Education 
BA/BS in Middle 
School, Secondary 
School, Math, 
Science or Special 
Education 
Fraction of Time Between Sophomore Year and 
Graduation Year Program in Effect 
-0.029 
(0.089) 
-0.004 
(0.076) 
College GPA 
-0.138** 
(0.047) 
-0.011 
(0.040) 
Unemployment Rate (in percent) 
-0.016 
(0.029) 
-0.011 
(0.025) 
BA/BS Degrees in Education in Graduation Year 
as a Fraction of All BA/BS Degrees 
-1.008 
(1.209) 
-1.194 
(1.041) 
Constant 
0.293 
(1.168) 
0.395 
(1.008) 
Observations 8,147 8,147 
Reported coefficients are marginal effects.  Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
 
